

IMPACT OF DIVERSITY ON THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

**A Monograph
by
COL Charles M. Evans
United State Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 2013-01

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> OMB No. 074-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED	
			Monograph, JUN 2012-MAY 2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Impact of Diversity on the Civil-Military Relationship			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Charles M. Evans, United States Army				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) Recent concern exists regarding the gap between the military, its civilian leaders, and society, and the importance of achieving diversity among the military leadership that is representative of the soldiers they lead and the nation they serve. Civil-military relations and diversity, which usually appear to be two distinct and separate topics, are interrelated. Failure to address them will negatively impact the military's ability to sustain a high quality force capable of meeting the nation's security requirements. This monograph examines the correlations between diversity and the impact on the civil-military relations of the United States.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Civil-Military Relations, Society, Military Leadership, Diversity			15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: COL Charles M. Evans

Monograph Title: IMPACT OF DIVERSITY ON THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Dan C. Fullerton, Ph.D.

_____, Second Reader
G. Scott Gorman, Ph.D.

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Thomas C. Graves, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2013 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

IMPACT OF DIVERSITY ON THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP, by COL Charles M. Evans, 58 pages.

Recent concern exists regarding the gap between the military, its civilian leaders, and society, and the importance of achieving diversity among the military leadership that is representative of the soldiers they lead and the nation they serve. Civil-military relations and diversity, which usually appear to be two distinct and separate topics, are interrelated. Failure to address them will negatively impact the military's ability to sustain a high quality force capable of meeting the nation's security requirements. This monograph examines the correlations between diversity and the impact on the civil-military relations of the United States.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
ACRONYMNS	iv
ILLUSTRATIONS	v
IMPACT OF DIVERSITY ON THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP	1
Introduction.....	1
Civil-Military Relations.....	5
The Military – The Citizen-Soldier and The Professional Ascendency	12
The Military Leader	19
The Civilian Leadership.....	23
The Impact of Institutional Change	26
Society	36
Diversity	41
Conclusion	47
APPENDIX A	53
BIBLIOGRAPHY	54

ACRONYMNS

AVF	All-Volunteer Force
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DOD	Department of Defense
D-SC	Democrat-South Carolina
MID	Military-Industrial Complex
MLDC	Military Leadership Diversity Commission
PME	Professional Military Education
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
U.S.	United States

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Civil-Military Relationship Paradigm.....	11
Figure 2. Military Participation.	37
Figure 3. Diversity Progression Matrix.	44
Figure 4. Tensions affecting the Civil-Military Relationship.....	48

IMPACT OF DIVERSITY ON THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Introduction

In comments to the 2011 graduates of the United States Military Academy, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen stated, “I fear they do not know us. . . . I fear they do not comprehend the full weight of the burden we carry or the price we pay when we return from battle.”¹ These comments place in context the idea that society as a whole does not understand the military and captures one, often less regarded, aspect of what is referred to as the civil-military gap. To understand this gap, it is important to address all facets of the discussion, and more importantly, why this gap exists, and what impact it has on the national security of the United States. Admiral Mullen is not alone in his concerns regarding the civil-military divide as many other senior leaders have expressed this concern in recent years.

In a press release issued in 2009, Representative James E. Clyburn (D-SC) stated, “Just like our military looks like America, so too must our general officers.”² As evidenced by Representative Clyburn’s comments, another area in which senior leaders have expressed concern is the importance of achieving a level of diversity among the uniformed military leadership that is representative of the soldiers they lead and the nation they serve.³ So significant is this concern, that Congress mandated the establishment of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) as part of the 2009 Defense Authorization Act, tasking it with the broad charter of

¹ Pew Research Center, “The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era,” *Symposium* (Washington, DC: Willard Intercontinental Hotel, 5 October 2011), 2, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/10/pew_research_military_event_TRANSCRIPT.pdf (accessed 20 November 2012).

² Military Leadership Diversity Commission, *From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military* (Arlington: Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 15 March 2011), 15.

³ Ibid.

conducting a comprehensive study of the policies associated with the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces.⁴ The Commission's final report, published in March 2011, concluded that top military leaders are neither representative of the population they serve nor the forces they lead.⁵ Data collected by the MLDC reveals that a significant disparity exists between the demographic representation of the senior military leaders in relation to the demographic composition of the enlisted soldiers and the United States population.⁶ While the findings captured in the final report meet the requirements of its charter and provides recommendations, it does not fully answer the question as to why diversity is important.

While the discussion of civil-military relations and diversity may appear to be two distinct and separate topics, this monograph will demonstrate that they are, in fact, interrelated. Furthermore, failure to achieve diversity within the force directly impacts the relations between the military and the nation it serves.

The interrelated topics of civil-military relations and diversity have been themes throughout the history of the United States dating back to the founding of the Republic.⁷ The purpose of this monograph is to provide an examination of the correlations between diversity and its impact on the civil-military relations of the United States. While the U.S. military is one of the most diverse and inclusive organizations in the world, more must be done to ensure that its senior leaders are representative of the soldiers they lead and the nation they serve. As the demographics

⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate. *Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009*. S. 3001. 110th Cong., 2d sess. (14 October 2008), S 123.

⁵ Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 39-40.

⁶ Ibid. While the majority of the discussion found in this monograph applies to all services of the Armed Forces, for the sake of simplicity, Army will represent all of the Armed Services, General will represent all flag officers, and the term soldier will represent the rank and file of all services.

⁷ Pew Research Center, 11. Comments made by Rick Atkinson during Pew symposium.

of the United States continue to shift, and the Army becomes more disconnected from society, it is imperative that both the civilian and uniformed military leaders address these shifts, and work towards increasing diversity among its General Officers. Achieving a level of diversity commensurate with that of the nation will make the military a more effective organization that draws upon the experiences, skills, and knowledge of the American people and serve to decrease the civil-military gap. Conversely, failure to achieve this requisite level of diversity will result in a widening of the gap between the military, its civilian leaders, and the society it serves. Furthermore, in a period where there is competition for a limited recruiting pool, achieving greater diversity will assist the military in meeting its recruiting goals and ensure it is attracting the very best the nation has to offer. Conversely, failure to achieve this requisite level of diversity will result in a widening of the gap between the civil-military gap, reduce the quality of the force, and limit access to an already shrinking recruiting pool.

Chapter One establishes a context for the discussion of civil-military relations, which allows better understanding of all facets of this complex relationship, and provides a basis for discussion throughout the remainder of the paper. The chapter begins by providing a historical perspective of civil-military relations and then transitions to a contemporary view. Chapter One concludes by establishing a model, which identifies uniformed military leadership, elected or appointed civilian leadership, and society as the three actors involved in civil-military relations. It also addresses the friction that exists between them and the factors that pressure the relationship.

Chapter Two discusses the military profession and provides a context for whom the military actors in the relationship are and what specific roles they play. This chapter also addresses the political climate, societal values, and national security environments, which over time have impacted the roles of the military actors. Once the context of civil-military relations has been established and the military actors identified, Chapters Three and Four focus on two of the primary actors in this relationship: the uniformed military leaders and the civilian leaders

responsible for overseeing and directing the Army. These chapters provide the reader with an understanding of the roles and perspectives of these specific actors over time framed in terms of who has lead, who leads now, and who will lead.

Chapter Five examines the impact of institutional changes to the Army and their impact on the civil-military relationship and diversity. It includes discussion on the desegregation of the Army, the transition to the All-Volunteer Force (AVF): Base Realignment, and Closure (BRAC): the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, contemporary warfare, the Cold War, and the reduction of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs at numerous universities across the nation.

Chapter Six examines society as the third actor associated with the civil-military relationship by addressing changing societal values overtime and how these values affect the civil-military relationship. The chapter provides a historical and contemporary discussion of societal values and how the American people perceive the military based on these values. The chapter concludes by analyzing the current recruiting base in terms of who is propensed to serve and who is eligible to serve.

The final chapter defines the term “diversity” by examining the current and projected demographic trends with in the United States, and how these factors impact the Army’s ability to sustain a high quality AVF that ultimately shrinks the civil-military gap. Additionally, this chapter examines how the discussion of diversity goes beyond one of ethnicity and gender and focuses on the importance of all aspects of diversity to include education, skills, and background to name a few.

Through this research, a better understanding will be attained as to why diversity is important and why failing to attain a level of diversity commensurate with that of the nation will have an adverse effect on the Army. Not only will a failure in this regard widen the already existing civil-military gap, but also threaten the Army’s ability to sustain a high quality AVF and provide a force capable of meeting the security requirements of the Nation.

Civil-Military Relations

In his study of strategy, Carl von Clausewitz paid particular attention to civil-military relations and posited that the people, the government, and the commander of the army each play a critical role in relation to employment of the armed forces.⁸ The term *civil-military relations* describes the tensions that exist between these actors, and the paradox associated with maintaining civilian control over the military. To comprehend fully the tensions among the actors in the civil military relationship, one must begin by first understanding the political evolution of the United States, and the contrasting values and attitudes held by each over time. It is also important to explore the changing roles played by the three actors throughout the nation's history.

Tensions between the military, civilian leadership, and society date back to the American Revolution, and, in large part, are manifested in the contrasts between the liberal principles upon which the nation was founded and the more conservative values and realist attitudes held by those who serve in the military. Samuel P. Huntington, in his book, *The Soldier and the State*, argues that Liberalism has always been the dominant political ideology in the United States, and that Liberalism does not understand and is hostile to military institutions and the military function.⁹ Based on Huntington's argument that the heart of Liberalism is individualism and, in contrast, the military man depends on subordination, a natural gap exists between the nation's liberal political leaders, its liberal society, and its conservative military.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the contrasting attitudes and viewpoints, which led to the founding of the nation, it is important to establish a basic frame of reference for the political traditions of the United States. The founders of the United States were

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89.

⁹ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1959), 143-44.

in large part influenced by the writings of British liberals such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and Thomas Hobbes, all of whom stressed the values of individualism, capitalism, private interest, and the market economy.¹⁰ These values formed the basis of early liberal thought in the United States and were generated in direct response to the tyranny imposed by the British Monarchy during the 18th Century, both internally to England and externally throughout the American Colonies. Louis Hartz, in his book, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, defined liberalism as a set of political values based on a combination of individual freedom, equality of opportunity, free markets, and political representativeness.¹¹ British political philosopher, John Locke, argued that each man has a natural right to life, life liberty, and property, and in turn establishes a contract with the government to protect these rights. Locke's argument was in keeping with the views of Thomas Hobbes, but he went further by contending that when the government becomes tyrannical, it has broken its contract with the people and therefore the people have a right to overthrow the tyrant.¹² Based on these beliefs it seems only natural that the American Colonists would revolt in order to depose a tyrant in the form of the British Monarchy. The tenets of early American Liberalism are codified in the Declaration of Independence, which states:

We hold these truths self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, - That whenever any Form of Government, becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it¹³

¹⁰ Keith Krawczynski, ed., *The American Revolution, 1763-1789*, Vol. 12 (Detroit Free Press, 2003), 118.

¹¹ Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., *American Civil-Military Relations: the Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 93.

¹² Shaun P. Young, *Beyond Rawls: an Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), 30-33.

¹³ *The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States: with Index*

As the above passage demonstrates, the signatories of the Declaration were in agreement concerning the tyranny of the British Monarchy, and based on their liberal beliefs, were compelled to revolt against the Crown. The Declaration of Independence also brings to light the early discussion of civil-military relations, and shapes the later debate concerning the role of the military in the new nation. During the period leading up to the American Revolution, the British military carried out policies that many colonists saw as serious abuses of proper civil-military relations.¹⁴ In addressing these abuses, Thomas Jefferson made the following charges against the British Monarchy when he stated, “He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislature. He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to Civil Power.”¹⁵

In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the issue of the military and its role in the new nation was a contentious issue. Adhering to their liberal principles and recent experience with the British military, the majority of Americans viewed a large, standing professional military as both unnecessary and a significant threat to the nation. They feared that a professional army would undermine individual liberty, threaten democracy by intervening in politics, burden the economy with useless expenditures, and lead the nation into wars.¹⁶ During this period, many Americans, to include Thomas Jefferson, favored militias, or “citizen-soldiers” as the backbone of the nation’s defense. While Federalists argued in favor of a large standing Army, the consensus

(New York: Bantam Classics, 1998), 53.

¹⁴ *The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States: with Index*, 5. Quartering of soldiers in private residences and seizing personal belongings were specifically addressed later in the Third Amendment of the Constitution.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁶ William B. Skelton, “Samuel P. Huntington, and the Roots of the American Military Tradition,” *The Journal of Military History* 60, no. 2 (April 1996), 325.

of the Liberal Founders prevailed and the nascent nation moved forward with a small regular army supported by a well-regulated compulsory-service militia.¹⁷

The speeches and writings of the Founding Fathers clearly indicate that the military should be subordinated to civilian power, but contrary to popular belief, the United States Constitution does not provide for civilian control of the military.¹⁸ This omission is understandable based on the period of history, and is most likely a reflection of the experiences of the Founding Fathers themselves. In a time when the military was composed of citizen-soldiers, it would not have occurred to the Framers that citizens such as George Washington or Andrew Jackson, who held military rank during the war, would have a fundamentally different approach to matters than any other citizen.¹⁹ The Framers, at the time, were unable to envision a separate military class of citizens. In spite of this omission, the Framers did include in the Constitution several measures, which would not only limit the power of the military, but also ensure that no single branch of the government was fully in control. Under the basic document, Congress was given the power to declare war and raise armies, and the President was empowered as the

¹⁷ Russell F. Weigley, ed., "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 412.

¹⁸ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Bantam Classics, 1982), 112. As pointed out later in the text and reinforced by Huntington (163-165), the idea of civilian control and subordination of the military were simply unknown to the Founding Fathers. However the *Federalist Papers*, and in particular Nos. 22-29 and 41, refer to the responsibility and authority of the elected civilian government to oversee the military and provide for the defense of the nation. On page 112 of Federalist Paper no. 22, Alexander Hamilton when discussing the raising of armies and the equipping of fleets charges that "Congress have unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and money-to govern the army and navy-to direct their operations."

¹⁹ Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995), 197-98.

Commander in Chief.²⁰ A third check on the power and aspirations of a professional standing army was the reliance on the states' militias to serve as a counterbalance.²¹ What the Framers were attempting to create was a government so constructed that its military forces could neither attempt nor become an instrument for a coup d'état.²²

While not specifically annotated in the Constitution, the desire of the Framers to assert civilian control over the military is clearly established and engrained in the democratic system of the United States. Author Richard Kohn states, "Civilian control is not a fact, but a process that varies over time and is very much "situational," that is dependent on the issues and personalities, civilian and military involved at any given point."²³ Kohn's statement is correct; however, it is arguable that throughout the nation's history, the American people have held fast to liberal views concerning the military.

With an understanding of the Framers' desires, the shortcomings of the Constitution, and the liberal leanings of the American people, how does the nation assert and maintain civilian control over the military? Samuel Huntington argues that the contemporary issue is not armed revolt against the government, but more significantly, the relation between the military and politician.²⁴ Looking again at the actors associated with civil-military relations, Huntington's observation can be further refined to explore the relationships between the military, the civilian

²⁰ *The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States: with Index*, 65, 70.

²¹ Richard Kohn, ed., *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 85.

²² Ibid.

²³ Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest* 37 (Spring 1994), 3.

²⁴ Huntington, 163-20.

leadership, and society. Understanding the roles of these actors and the interactions between each allows the reader to see the existing gaps in this relationship and identify areas that could potentially be closed through increasing diversity within the Army.

Often when discussing civil-military relations, the conversation is limited primarily to the relationship between the civilian leadership *vis-a-vis* their interaction with the military leadership. The conversation is further narrowed by focusing on what type of advice, and how much should be offered by the military leaders regarding policy and the execution of military activities, whether they are combat operations, budget, or force structure. However, it is arguable that a more broad approach is necessary to understand fully the depth of the topic, and its impact on the security of the United States. In addition to the relationship between leaders, both civilian and military, it is important to understand how society bears on this relationship.

The paradigm for the civil-military relationship, as depicted in Figure 1, closely aligns with Clausewitz's model, or "Trinity" of the associated actors, and is intended to depict the tensions and gaps that exist between each.²⁵ The manner in which it is presented demonstrates that the civil-military relationship is underpinned by the military, both in the form of its leadership and as the institution itself. Therefore, the military forms the bottom point of the inverted pyramid. The second point of the model addresses the elected or appointed civilian leadership, or what can be called, *those who decide*. The third and final point of the model focuses on the society, which the military not only serves, but also relies upon to fill its ranks.

²⁵ Clausewitz, 89. Clausewitz identifies three areas that constitute war. The first, primordial violence, hatred, and change concerns the people (Society). The Second, chance and probability represents the commander of his army (or the military). The third, subordination as an instrument of policy, represents the government (elected or appointed civilian leaders).




Figure 1. Civil-Military Relationship Paradigm²⁶

While several different schools of thought exist regarding proper civil-military relations, for the most part, all share a common theme. First and foremost, there must be civilian control of the military. In order to achieve this, the military must remain disengaged from politics.²⁷ For the remainder of this paper the topic of civil-military relations will be discussed in the context of Samuel P. Huntington's theory that the most effective way of achieving this aim is through what he terms the *objective control* of the military.²⁸ In contrast to other authorities, such as Morris Janowitz, Huntington argues that the military is a separate and distinct entity, which theoretically is not compatible with society as a whole.²⁹ This belief is based on what Huntington identifies as the contrasting imperatives involved in the civil-military relationship, the first of which is the

²⁶ Created by Author based on writings of Carl von Clausewitz. *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89.

²⁷ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil—Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 9.

²⁸ Huntington, 189-192, 260-263.

²⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 39. In contrast to Huntington, who believed that the military was a separate entity apart from society, Janowitz believed that the military was a reflection of society and the best way to maintain political control was by integrating civilian values into the military, thus making the military more like society.

functional imperative and addresses external threats and the need for the state and its military to defend the nation.³⁰ These second imperative is *societal* and relates to the values held by society, in this case the American people.³¹ Objective civilian control relies on the *professionalism* of the military officers who agree to serve implicitly the state regardless of what civilian group attains legitimate authority, which in turn minimizes political influence and results in the military voluntarily becoming apolitical.³²

The Military – The Citizen-Soldier and the Professional Ascendancy

While an in-depth analysis of the role of the armed forces within the civil-military relationship is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to establish a fundamental understanding of who the military actors are as well as the specific roles they play. It is also useful to understand the political climate, the societal values, and the national security environments, which have shaped these roles and actors throughout the history of the nation. Based on these observations, it is apparent that military leadership has transitioned from one that is representative, and in fact indistinguishable from society, to one that is less diverse and more institutionalized than ever. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the military leadership is quickly becoming increasingly more isolated from the soldiers it leads and the nation it serves.

The contemporary military leadership consists of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS): the Service Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders, as well as other General Officers who provide advice to the civilian leaders and represent the institution.³³ These

³⁰ Thomas Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain* (New York: Continuum, 2011), 20-21.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Nielsen and Snider, 5.

³³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning*

individuals, like their predecessors, play a pivotal role and interact differently with the two civilian actors within the relationship. In relation to the civilian political leadership, these individuals primarily serve as advisors on all military matters and are charged with providing options and the best possible military advice. Equally important, the senior military leaders not only shape the institution by virtue of their position, but also represent the institution in terms of how it behaves and how society perceives it.

The military, both in the form of its senior leaders and as an institution, plays two critical roles in the civil-military relationship. The first relates directly to civilian control of the military, a notion firmly established by the Founding Fathers and discussed in some detail thus far. The second role, which is often overlooked or marginalized, provides a horizontal dimension to the relationship and addresses how the military fits in with the society it is not only sworn to serve, but also on which it relies to fill its ranks.³⁴ The relationship is particularly tenuous as the values and discipline required by the military profession are often at odds with the liberal perspectives of American Society.

No two constructs have had greater bearing on the military's participation in the civil-military relationship than that of the *citizen-soldier* and the professional ascendancy of the armed forces. These factors, coupled with breadth and the pace of national security developments, particularly since the latter half of the Twentieth Century, have fundamentally impacted the manner in which the military participates in the civil-military relationship. Historically the United States, in keeping with its liberal principles, has shunned a large standing military and relied on *citizen-soldiers* in time of conflict by raising armies and its leaders from the society it defends.

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 11 August 2011), Chapter II.

³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *The Armed Forces Officer: 2007 Edition (National Defense University)*, Revised ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2007), 16.

Once the conflict subsides, those recruited to fight and lead were integrated back into society in the spirit of Cincinnatus.³⁵ Prior to the American Revolution, the colonies had very little military tradition and subsequently no readily available reservoir of experienced battlefield leaders.³⁶ Therefore, it relied upon its citizens to fill the leadership ranks both in its small regular army and in the militias. This in turn framed the experience of the Founding Fathers and precluded them from envisioning a separate class of persons exclusively dedicated to military leadership.³⁷ In spite of their aversion to a standing army, the Founding Fathers did understand one was necessary to perform garrison duty and defend against Indian threats on the frontier.³⁸ Therefore, the young United States adopted a *dual-army* system composed of a small standing army, which complemented the militia. While the size of the regular army ebbed and flowed for the next century and a half, this liberal concept remained largely intact until the mid-twentieth Century. In theory, this model would produce an officer corps that was representative of the society it serves. To a large degree, it did so until the post WWII period and entry into the Cold War.

Samuel Huntington opens his chapter on the rise of the military profession by stating, “The art of fighting is an old accomplishment of mankind. The military profession is a recent

³⁵ *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Philadelphia: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 2003), s.v. “Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus.” Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus was a Roman Statesman who gained fame for his selfless devotion to the republic in times of crisis and giving up the reins of power when the crisis was over. He was a farmer above all, although when called to serve his country, he did so willingly – briefly and without ambition.

³⁶ Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: a Military History of the United States of America* (London: Free Press, 1984), 55.

³⁷ Huntington, 165.

³⁸ Marvin Kriedberg and Henry Merton, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, Department of the Army, November 1955, Washington, 24-27.

creation of modern society.”³⁹ He goes on to argue that prior to 1800 there was no such thing as a professional officer corps.⁴⁰ From the perspective of the young American nation, whose founders could not envision a separate military class, it is easy to agree with Huntington’s assessment. However, early in the nineteenth century, several events transpired which formed the nexus for the transformation to a professional military.

The disastrous performance of the American militia units during the war of 1812 brought to light the realization that significant changes were required with regards to the defense policy of the United States. Defeats by British Regulars in almost every engagement demonstrated that the United States was no more prepared for the War of 1812 than they were for the American Revolution. For this reason, and in the interests of national security, America needed a professional armed force of its own.⁴¹ Understanding the problem, the question for the civilian leaders was how to effect that transformation and create a professional military force. Notwithstanding, the lesson learned from its recent wars, the impetus for this transformation came primarily from the lessons of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars and formed the foundation for the early professional education of America’s military leaders.⁴² The writings of Clausewitz and his contemporary, Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini codified these lessons learned, and provided a framework for follow-on works by American military thinkers such as Dennis Hart Mahan and Henry W. Halleck. By the middle of the century, the defense policy of the

³⁹ Huntington, 19.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 163.

⁴¹ Arthur T. Hadley, *The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure, America's Armed Forces: a Report from the Field* (New York: Random House, 1986), 30.

⁴² Millett and Maslowski, 127.

United States had shifted away from reliance primarily on the militia, and conditions were set for the ascendancy of a professional class of military officers.⁴³

From the beginning of the century and through the Civil War, the military profession was held in generally high regard by society and was considered an honorable profession. This popularity owes more to the military's contribution towards Western Expansion than it does to national defense. During this period, the military made the West accessible by building roads, supervising engineering projects, and providing protection to settlers.⁴⁴ Also during this period, the military profession continued to evolve in terms of both technological advancement as well as professional education. However, as Samuel Huntington notes, "in the aftermath of the Civil War, there was an unrelenting hostility of virtually all the American Community toward virtually all things military."⁴⁵ Considered by many to be the "the Dark Ages" of the American military, Huntington contends that this very isolation, neglect, and rejection by society and its leaders, made these same years the most fertile, creative, and formative in the history of the Armed Forces.⁴⁶ Emerging from this isolation, the officer corps developed a distinct professional character, and produced military institutions and ideals that would serve the nation well in the approaching World Wars.⁴⁷ While the internal benefits of this military renaissance were noteworthy, they came at the cost of distancing the society from its military.

⁴³ Millett and Maslowski, 130.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 130-134.

⁴⁵ Huntington, 227.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Edward M. Coffman, "The Long Shadow of the Soldier and the State" *The Journal of Military History* 55, no. 1 (January 1991), 73-74. During this period, Brevet Major General Emory Upton, considered by many to be the most influential young officer of his time, published two important works, *The Armies of Europe and Asia*, and *The Military Policy of the United*

While much discussion on the civil-military relationship and the evolution of the military profession can be garnered from the first half of the Twentieth Century, with a few notable exceptions, the outlook of civilian leaders and society remained relatively unchanged with regards to the military. In keeping with its liberal tradition, in the case of both World Wars, the nation transitioned from a relatively small peacetime professional army to a large force only to draw down again once the conflict concluded. In each instance, many of the military leaders who served during the war were drawn from society. Following hostilities, many returned to their communities and resumed their civilian professions. However, it is notable that the National Defense Act of 1916 established the preeminence of the Regular Army as the first line of national defense and provided that it be increased to a level of 175,000 over a period of five years.⁴⁸

The end of World War II marked the beginning of a new era in American defense policy. With the advent of the Cold War, the United States, with public approval, developed a new strategy of deterrence that called for the sustainment of a large standing military force in a time of relative peace.⁴⁹ In contrast to previous periods of American civil-military history, the Cold War constrained liberal tendencies in U.S. society by forcing an outward orientation, and encouraging acceptance of the military.⁵⁰ From the beginning of the Cold War until the early 1960s, the military enjoyed a rather positive relationship with society and its civilian leaders. However, early

States. Additionally, General William T. Sherman, while serving as the Commanding General of the United States Army, was instrumental in establishing post-graduate professional military schooling, to include laying the foundation for the establishment of the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, which eventually became the Command and General Staff College. The Root reforms (1899-1917) continued this professionalism of the military by establishing institutions such as the War College and branch specific schools.

⁴⁸ Kriedberg and Merton, 192-194.

⁴⁹ Millett and Maslowski, 471

⁵⁰ Johnson and Metz, 210.

in the Kennedy Administration, a lack of trust between the military and civilian leaders began to emerge. The Administration felt that the Joint Chiefs failed to give adequate advice, and following the Bay of Pigs experience in 1961, the President began to question the professional competence of the Chiefs.⁵¹ As a result, President Kennedy recalled General Maxwell Taylor to active duty to become his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. This, coupled with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's perceived lack of respect for the military, caused the Chiefs to distrust their civilian leadership and put tremendous strain on the relationship that would endure for until the end of the Johnson Administration.⁵² Until the mid-1960s, the military was generally well respected by the American population. However, Vietnam War policies tended to aggravate the natural friction that exists between the military and society and by 1966, the military had lost the trust and support of many Americans. In some cases, this loss of trust was unwarranted, as the military was simply fighting the war they were sent to fight. However, conduct such as the Mai Lai Massacre and bombings of villages, televised for the first time in history, eroded public support for the war and diminished the public's perception of those fighting it.⁵³

In spite of the effects of the Vietnam War, the United States continued to support a large standing military until the conclusion of the Cold War in 1989, at which time attempts were made to once again revert to a liberal approach calling for a small standing Army in a time of peace. In spite of several conflicts and constabulary activities, the United States over the following decade took significant steps to reduce the size and influence of the military.

⁵¹ Herspring, 134-149.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York: Dell, 1984), 65-67.

The Military Leader

Having briefly outlined the historical environment of the American civil-military relationship it is now important to discuss who leads the military and what their connection to society is. In the early days of the republic, military leaders were as representative of the society from which they were drawn and for the most part were indistinguishable from their civilian counterparts. While it is still a requirement for military officers to be U.S citizens, it is arguable that with the ascendancy of the military profession any correlation to the nation's founding roots stops there. During the Nineteenth and early part of the Twentieth Centuries, the military officer's connection to society varied depending upon the security situation. Writing in the mid-1950s, Morris Janowitz argued that military leadership is representative of society.⁵⁴ His position is understandable at time when large standing armies of the World Wars and the Cold War were the norm. However, as the military continues to decline in size, that the gap between the military officer and society will continue to grow. Some believe that the military and in particular its officer corps is being transformed into a separate caste totally detached from the society it serves.⁵⁵

The MLDC's Final Report published in March 2011, concludes that the demographic composition of the officer corps is far from representative of the American population. The report continues to say that officers are much less demographically diverse than the enlisted troops they lead.⁵⁶ It is highly likely that this trend will continue as the nation sees increases in African-

⁵⁴ Janowitz, 79. Janowitz argued that since the end of the Civil War, the Officer Corps was recruited on a geographic basis, which would in turn makes them representative of the enlisted soldiers they lead. He further argued that if the Officer Corps were representative of the nation, they would not be inclined to upset the political balance.

⁵⁵ Atkinson, 8.

⁵⁶ Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 40.

American and Hispanic youth and a proportional decline in White-non Hispanic youth. In order to gain an understanding of the composition of the current officer corps and those who will serve as senior leaders in the future, this research will address several factors to include income, education, geographic orientation, ethnicity, promotion trends, and selection statistics for promotion to General Officer. Additionally, it is important to discuss non-statistical trends, which influence composition and character of the Officer Corps.

Research suggests that contrary to popular belief, the military as a whole and officers in particular, do not join because they are financially disadvantaged or have limited economic potential in the civilian sector. Data provided by the Center for Data Analysis indicates that the average cadet entering ROTC or the United States Military Academy in 2007 came from households with a medium income of nearly \$70,000 that is well above the national average of \$50,428.⁵⁷ While family income data does not exist for enlistees, CDA research indicates that the majority of those enlisting in the military are drawn from the middle to upper class, albeit with a slightly lower household income than those joining the officer corps.⁵⁸ In summary, it is arguable that from an economic standpoint the officer corps is more representative of the enlisted Soldiers they lead than they are of the American population.

From an educational perspective, the Officer Corps is more educated than their civilian contemporaries or the soldiers they lead. The requirement for officers to obtain a bachelor's degree prior to commissioning contrasts sharply with the twenty-five percent of twenty-two to twenty-seven year olds in the civilian sector who have attained the same level of education.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Shanea J. Watkins and James Sherk, "Who Serves in the U.S. Military? Demographic Characteristics of Enlisted Troops and Officers," The Heritage Foundation (21 August 2008), 9.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 11.

Furthermore, Professional Military Education (PME) programs afford officers opportunities throughout their career to obtain not only advanced military training but also graduate-level advanced civil schooling. Very few enlisted recruits enter the service with a college degree and there is currently no requirement for them to obtain one. However, many enlisted take advantage of education programs, such as the post-9/11 GI Bill, and often earn a degree during their period of service.

In terms of ethnicity in relation to the population, research demonstrates that officers entering the military are generally representative of the larger American population and under-represented in some categories in relation to the soldiers they lead. For officers commissioned in 2007, data shows that when compared to a relevant population group, Caucasians are proportionally represented, African Americans were over represented, and Hispanics were under represented.⁶⁰ Officer representation in comparison to enlisted members demonstrates that Caucasian officers are significantly over-represented, while African American and Hispanic officers are under-represented.⁶¹ While this data would suggest that military officers are generally representative of the population and those they lead, it is not necessarily the case as the data is based only on entry-level or Company Grade Officers. Looking at the officer cohort as a whole relative to the enlisted force, minority officers are significantly under-represented.⁶² Additionally, the entire officer cohort in comparison to the U.S. population is under-represented in terms of minority officers.

⁶⁰ Watkins and Sherk, 12.

⁶¹ David R. Segal and Mady Wechler Segal, “America’s Military Population,” Population Reference Bureau (2004), 20-23.

⁶² Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 40.

This raises the question as to why the Officer Corps transitions from one, which upon initial entry is generally representative of the nation and its soldiers, to one that is significantly estranged at its senior ranks. While many factors contribute to this, much evidence exists which indicates that this is a direct result of branching decisions made by officers and their opportunities to serve in specific career fields. RAND research indicates that officers who reach the top ranks of the military tend to come from career fields that are disproportionately occupied by Caucasians, and the relative lack of minorities in these fields has a significant impact on the diversity of the senior leadership.⁶³ In contrast, minority officers are concentrated disproportionately in support career fields with less potential for promotion to the senior ranks, and are therefore more inclined to leave the military.⁶⁴ Until the recent announcement by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, females in the Army were excluded from serving in the Combat Arms branches, which placed them at a significant disadvantage for promotion to the senior leadership ranks.⁶⁵

While entry-level officers drawn from the population may be connected to society, over time this connection wanes as officers become more institutionalized the longer they serve. Recent observations of a Senior Service College Seminar support this argument. In the early weeks of the course, a professor commented that the group of fifteen Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels with twenty years of service was not diverse. This was met with a negative reaction from the group who argued vehemently that their geographic backgrounds, under-graduate

⁶³ Nelson Lim, Michelle Cho, and Kimberly Curry, *Planning for Diversity: Options and Recommendations for DOD Leaders* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), iii.

⁶⁴ Segal and Wechler Segal, 20.

⁶⁵ On 23 January 2013, outgoing Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta lifted the ban on females serving in combat positions in the military. This announcement will open up hundreds of career fields associated with reaching the top ranks of the military.

degrees, branches of service, and past assignments made them diverse. However, after a long period of observation, it is evident that, while the group may differ on minor points, they generally share a similar institutionalized outlook regarding politics and societal issues.⁶⁶

In conclusion, at the entry-level, the officer corps is generally representative of the society and its soldiers. However, at the field grade, and in particular the General Officer level, this is not the case.⁶⁷ Instead, one finds an officer corps that is disproportionately male, Caucasian, highly educated, and institutionalized to a degree, all of which significantly disconnects them from not only the soldiers they lead but also society as a whole.

The Civilian Leadership

Throughout the history of the United States, the connection between civilian and military leadership has followed a similar course. Beginning with the founding of the Republic, where little distinction could be made, through the ascendancy of the military profession until the late nineteenth century, it is arguable that civilian leaders have maintained at least a functional connection with the military through either conscription or voluntary service during times of crisis. However, two events have occurred since that time that have placed pressure on that connection, and threaten to exacerbate further the civil-military gap. While both will be discussed in detail later, the transition to the AVF in 1973 and the end of the Cold War in 1989 have greatly affected the composition of those who lead the military in a civilian capacity. The results of which many fear is creating a meritocratic class, with no military experience, and therefore, no understanding of the forces they may decide to employ.

⁶⁶ While the group of officers understand the apolitical responsibilities conversations during the recent political cycle indicate that the group as a whole shares conservative political views. The group also shared similar views on societal issues such same sex marriage, the Second Amendment, and conduct of senior officers and government officials.

⁶⁷ See Appendix 1.

The term *meritocratic*, or merit class, was commonly used in the early 1990s to describe a subset of the Baby-Boomer generation, which valued educational achievement over practical experience. According to Nicholas Lemann, Dean and Henry R. Luce Professor of Journalism at Columbia University, members of the merit class were not necessarily born into it, but gained entry into America's elite on the strength of their academic achievement.⁶⁸ Lemann continues to posit that these individuals shun large corporate organizations, such as civil service, and do not serve in the military.⁶⁹ Christopher Lasch contends that not only is the merit class disconnected from the military, but also from society as a whole.⁷⁰ It is also important to note that most members of this merit class earned their academic credentials at some of America's top tier universities, and many of them will rise to positions of power within the government. Former soldier, Richard Miles, highlighted this point when writing of his experiences as a student at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

The nonchalance of my classmates, I soon found was not due to some sort of militant pacifism or left-wing prejudice. They simply did not know what questions to ask. The sum total of their knowledge about military matters . . . came from movies. This might be comical if it weren't for the fact that Georgetown grads end up in high places.⁷¹

Miles's comments highlight a concern shared by many that the merit class will ascend to high-level government positions where they influence defense policy while possessing little practical understanding of the military. Dale Hespring in his book, *The Pentagon and the*

⁶⁸ Nicholas Lemann, "Curse of the Merit Class: America's New Ruling Caste is Bad News for the Country," *The Washington Post* (9 February 1992), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/408104927?accountid=28992> (accessed 17 January 2013).

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Christopher Lasch, *The Revolt of the Elites: and the Betrayal of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 4.

⁷¹ Richard G. Miles, "Those Who Fight, Those Who Decide" *Newsweek*, Vol 122, Issue 21 (22 November 1993), 2.

Presidency, argues that prior military service is not a useful predictor of how well civilian leaders will interact and lead the military.⁷² This argument notwithstanding, there is a concern among many, both in and out of uniform, that a significant experience gap is developing between the civilian leaders and the forces they lead.

A review of data dating back to the Nixon administration validates this concern and shows a sharp decrease in the number of lawmakers, both in the executive and legislative branches who have prior military service. The number of veterans in Congress has steadily declined since the 91st Congress (1969-71) where nearly seventy-four percent of its members were veterans, to only twenty-one percent of the 112th Congress (2011-12) who had experience in uniform.⁷³ The same holds true for the executive branch that has seen veteran service in the Cabinet decline from roughly thirty-eight percent during the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan Administrations to only five percent in each administration since.⁷⁴

With the transition to the AVF and the post-Cold-War drawdown, there are less requirements and opportunities for Americans to share the common experience of military service. Even during the past ten years of sustained conflict, less than one percent of the American population has served.⁷⁵ These factors, coupled with the meritocracy's lack of

⁷² Herspring, 425.

⁷³ Jennifer E. Manning, "Membership of the 112th Congress: A Profile" Congressional Research Service (1 March 2011), 8, <http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/R41647.pdf> (accessed 16 December 2012).

⁷⁴ Data derived from research of multiple sources: Keith L. Justice, *Presidents, Vice Presidents, Cabinet Members, Supreme Court Justices, 1789-2003: Vital and Official Data*, Reprint ed. (Place Unknown: McFarland, 2010); Encyclopedia Britannica, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet>.

⁷⁵ Luis Martinez and Amy Bingham, "U.S. Veterans by the Numbers," *ABC News* (11 November 2011), 3, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-veterans-numbers/story?id=14928136#3> (accessed 16 January 2013).

propensity to serve, indicate that the nation will continue to see fewer civilian leaders with any practical experience on which to frame their perspectives or influence their decisions

The Impact of Institutional Change

Throughout history, nothing has had a greater impact on civil-military relations and served to widen the gap more than institutional change. While none has resulted in a serious threat as envisioned by the founding fathers, several events since the mid-Twentieth Century have seriously pressured the relationship. Changes brought about by the Cold War, the transition to the AVF, the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols): BRAC, and the reduction of ROTC programs at elite universities, have affected the military's relationship with society, its civilian leaders, or both.

In the aftermath of World War II, the majority of the American population assumed that following the societal imperative, the nation would revert to their liberal principles and significantly reduce the size and influence of the military. Millions of *citizen-soldiers* returned to society and, termed "America's Greatest Generation," many formed the core of those who would later serve as the nation's civilian leadership. However, the advent of the Cold War and the fear of nuclear annihilation quickly challenged this presumption by re-introducing the functional imperative.⁷⁶ This challenge would over-shadow the civilian-military relationship for the next forty-five years and continues to have an impact today.

Makubin Owens, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, posits that civil-military relations are essentially a bargain between the actors and periodically, this bargain must be renegotiated.⁷⁷ It is arguable that in contrast to the American Liberal

⁷⁶ Thomas Owens, 21-22.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 1. Owens states, "Civil-military relations in America essentially have constituted a *bargain* among the three parties: the American people, the government, and the military

principles, the national security necessities of the Cold War placed the functional imperative ahead of the social imperative and forced a re-negotiation of the bargain. The result was a bargain that allowed the nations to build the forces necessary to confront the Soviet threat.⁷⁸ In essence, at the end of the World War II, societal values and historical norms would suggest that the United States revert to a small standing military relying on society to fill its ranks in times of conflict. This approach correlates to Huntington's societal imperative. However, the Soviet threat forced the United States to maintain a larger standing army in keeping with Huntington's functional imperative, to ensure that America's security interests were met.

The greatest impact of the primacy of the functional imperative during the Cold War was the fact that the military simply could not be isolated, as was the norm in previous post-war periods. Not only did the realities of the Soviet threat and nuclear weapons require the military's expertise and involvement, it also kept the military visible to the American public through both conscription and the enlargement and sustainment of the military-industrial base.

From the perspective of the relationship between the civilian leaders and the military, liberal principles would have clearly demanded a reduction in the military's influence and a quarantine from involvement in policy making as had occurred in previous post-war periods. However, during the early years of the Cold War, this was not possible for several reasons. The Soviet Military threat and the U.S Policy of containment placed a heavy emphasis on the military instrument of power, which required involvement from the military.

The advent of the Cold War created a permanent defense establishment with a vastly expanded military budget that at its peak accounted for nearly ten percent of the Gross Domestic

institution.”

⁷⁸ Thomas Owens, 21.

Product of the United States.⁷⁹ This military-industrial complex (MID): as President Eisenhower referred to it, impacted all aspects of the civil-military relationship. On one hand, it created thousands of defense industry jobs and expanded the military footprint to hundreds of bases across the country. Conversely, these large defense expenditures negatively impacted society by deferring federal dollars away from social and domestic programs.⁸⁰ Either way, the result was an increased connection between the military and society. From the perspective of the civilian leaders, the MID brought military matters to the forefront of domestic politics in competition for defense contracts for their constituency, and military basing within their districts. From the military perspective, it invariably drew them into the political realm due to their professional expertise and provided them with a seat at the table that was uncharacteristic of previous post-war periods.

Another outcome of the Second World War and entry into the Cold War was passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent Amendment of 1949. This legislation, heavily influenced by both World War II organization and failures, established the fundamental Cold War defense organization.⁸¹ Of significant note, these actions established the Department of Defense, (DOD) created and expanded the powers of the Secretary of Defense, and designated a CJCS. While periodic changes were made, this legislation, in large part, dictated the structure of civil-military relations for nearly forty years by establishing the roles and responsibilities of the civilian and uniformed military leaders.

⁷⁹ John P. Resch, ed, "Military Industrial Complex," <http://go.galegroup.com/lumen.cgscarl.com/ps/i.do?action=interpret&id=GALEpercent7CCX3427300394&v=2.1&u=97mwrlib&it=r&p=GVRL&sw=w&authCount=1> (accessed 18 January 2013), 2.

⁸⁰ Sterling Michael Pavelec, ed., *The Military-Industrial Complex and American Society* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 62.

⁸¹ Millett and Maslowski, 480.

One of the most, if not the most, significant change which impacted the civil-military relations, was the transition of the military to an all-volunteer force in 1973. Not only did the debate on this contentious issue strain the relationship between the military and civilian leaders, it is arguable that more than any other factor it has had the greatest impact on the relationship between the military and the population it serves.

During America's 237-year history, it only relied on conscription to fill the ranks of its armed forces on four occasions, which in total constituted a period of only thirty-five years. During the remaining 199 years, the nation, in keeping with its liberal traditions, relied on its citizens to volunteer in defense of the nation. Prior to the Civil War, this concept was adequate for the defense of the nation. In times of conflict, Congress would increase the strength of the Regular Force, establish short-term volunteer units, and order states to furnish militia.⁸² However, after failed attempts to raise 500,000 volunteers following the Union defeat at Bull-Run in 1861, Union leaders realized volunteerism had most likely run its course.⁸³ In response, Congress passed the Militia Act of 1862, which included provisions to draft militia members into federal service if there were deficiencies in the number of individuals who volunteered for service. While this provision was not enacted, it demonstrated for the first time that the Federal government was willing to draft men for military service. However, in 1863, with requirements for military manpower steadily increasing, Congress passed the Enrollment Act, which authorized the first national draft in the United States resulting in the conscription of over 249,000 men for service in the Union Army from 1863-1865.⁸⁴

⁸² Robert K. Griffith Ph.D and Robert K. Griffith Jr., *The United States Army's Transition to the All Volunteer Force*, 1968-74 (Army Historical Series S/n 008-029-00307-4) (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 1997), 6-13.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

With the end of the Civil War, so too, came the end of conscription and the subject was not revisited until America's entry into World War I in 1917. Faced with the requirement to build a large force in response to inadequate numbers of volunteers, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 18 May 1917, which supplied the Armed Forces with nearly three million men.⁸⁵ However, the end of the war a year later eliminated the need for conscription. Many of the experiences gained during this period, in particular the selective service legislation, served to inform subsequent discussions regarding force structure and compulsory military service. During the post-war period, the nation continued its traditional aversion to a large standing military and peacetime conscription, but did acknowledge the requirement to mobilize quickly in the event of a future war. As a result, Congress the National Defense Act of 1920 established greater Federal control and standardization of the National Guard and the creation of a Federal Reserve force.⁸⁶ Additionally, the War Department received guidance to conduct peacetime manpower planning on the assumption that any future conflict would require conscription.⁸⁷ With the German invasion of France in 1940 and the perceived threat of war, the discussion of compulsory military service surfaced again in the United States. After much debate, the Selective Service Act of 1940 was passed, constituting the first peacetime draft in American history. During the period of 1940-1945, this legislation provided nearly two-thirds of the nearly fifteen million men who served during World War II.⁸⁸

In the aftermath of World War II, once again the United States reverted to its liberal tradition, seeking a drawdown of forces and the return to peacetime volunteer military. However,

⁸⁵ Kriedberg and Merton, 239-246.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 239-246.

⁸⁷ Griffith and Griffith Jr., 6-13.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

the occupation of Japan and Germany, coupled with the requirements of the nation's post-war security strategy, demanded a much larger force than was believed could be provided through volunteers.⁸⁹ In response to these requirements, Congress renewed the Selective Service Act in 1948, and conscription became a fixture in American Society for the next twenty-five years.⁹⁰

Between 1968 and 1973, President Richard Nixon, mainly in response to public opposition of the Vietnam War, undertook efforts to eliminate the draft, which resulted in an end to conscription on 30 June 1973.⁹¹ Since then, a hallmark of the 1917 legislation remains in place with the requirement that all males age eighteen through twenty-five must register for Selective Service. This provision not only provides a registry of those available to serve in the event that conscription is required in the future, but some argue that it also ensures a connection to society.⁹²

While a detailed discussion on the debate and subsequent transition to the AVF is beyond the scope of this paper, it provides an outstanding example of the contrasting imperatives associated with the civil-military relationship. From the societal perspective, the pressure to end conscription came from society with origins both in historic liberal traditions and in the contemporary reaction to the Vietnam War.⁹³ This fact was not lost on President Nixon who campaigned on the issue both during the 1968 and 1972 election cycles. From the functional imperative, the greatest concern was fear that the AVF would not provide enough volunteers to meet the security requirements of the nation. Former Senator John Warner, who served in the

⁸⁹ Griffith and Griffith Jr., 6-13.

⁹⁰ Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 11.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁹² Pew Research Center, 18.

⁹³ Griffith and Griffith Jr., 291.

Pentagon during AVF debate, states, “We thought it was the biggest gamble that had ever been done by civilian control of the military.”⁹⁴

Most would agree that the AVF has been a success. With some exceptions, the military has consistently met its recruiting goals, and for the most part the force has performed in a superb manner. However, during the past decade of war, the discussion of returning to some form of compulsory service been surfaced again by both civilian and military leaders. It is important to note that the United States is in the longest conflict of its history, while at the same time making the decision not to activate the selective service system.⁹⁵ This decision has resulted in the burden of over ten years of war falling on the shoulders of the volunteer force, to include the National Guard and Reserves. With less than one percent of the nation serving during this period, some will argue that a larger portion of society should share this burden through military service. However, in spite of the toll the wars have taken on the institution, its soldiers, and family members, there is an overwhelming opinion among Americans that the draft should not be reinstituted. In recent polling conducted by Pew research, nearly seventy-five percent of the American public oppose reinstating the draft.⁹⁶ Even more significant is that eighty-two percent of post 9-11 veterans oppose returning to the draft mainly due to their concerns that the quality of the force would suffer.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Pew Research Center, 20. In comments made by John Warner during the panel discussion on The Military-Civilian Gap, Warner does not expand upon why he thought this was a gamble aside from the fact that many elements of the uniformed side were concerned it would not work. Risks associated with the transition to the AVF are outlined in both Griffith’s and Bailey’s books.

⁹⁵ Pew Research Center, 18. Comments made by Larry Korb during Pew symposium.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 71.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 14.

Based on reluctance to activate the selective service system during the past decade, and the attitudes of society coupled with impending defense cuts, it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that the United States will return to any form of compulsory military service. From one perspective, this is positive in that the ranks of the armed forces will be filled with high quality recruits who want to serve. On the other hand, it will deprive the majority of the nation the opportunity to serve and forge a common experience among the citizenry.

Another significant factor of late twentieth century, which has impacted the civil-military relationship, was the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (commonly referred to as Goldwater-Nichols) and deals mainly with the relationship between the civilian leaders and the military leaders. Intended by its authors to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of military thinking and therefore advice to civilian leadership, some, will argue that it had unintended consequences which threatened the civil-military relationship.⁹⁸ Of greatest concern is the powers afforded to the CJCS, who under Goldwater-Nichols was named the principal military advisor to the President and included as a member of the National Security Council.⁹⁹ These powers, it is argued, gave the CJCS the ability to provide military advice not only when asked but also when not asked thus imposing a direct threat to civilian control of the military.¹⁰⁰ Richard Kohn argues that General Colin Powell, the first CJCS to serve his full term under Goldwater-Nichols, abused this power and intruded into the civilian realm of foreign policy.¹⁰¹ Another residual of Goldwater-Nichols within the military was the value placed on Joint

⁹⁸ Johnson and Metz, 202.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Kohn, 7. Kohn argues that General Powell used the new powers imparted by passage of Goldwater-Nichols to inappropriately wield influence to manipulate Congress, the media, interest groups, and public opinion. Kohn states, "Powell took it upon himself to be the arbiter of

Service. With the advent of this legislation, joint duty became desirable and greater emphasis was placed on PME. Officers, given the opportunity to study a wide range of topics, to include foreign policy and world politics, often meet or exceed the strategic acumen of the meritocratic class who commonly fills the ranks of the civilian leadership.¹⁰² This too potentially expands the gap between the military and civilian leadership.

The widening gap between the meritocratic civilian leadership, society, and the military leadership is also exacerbated by the absence of ROTC programs at America's top-tier universities.¹⁰³ While Georgetown University does have an ROTC program, Richard Miles point concerning the ascendancy of graduates from elite universities cannot be overlooked. In the early 1970's the opposition to the draft and the unpopularity of the Vietnam War caused many top-tier Universities to re-evaluate their relationships with the military. This re-evaluation, based on the war as well as genuine concerns regarding the quality and substance of ROTC instruction,

American military intervention overseas, and unprecedented policy role for a senior military officer. . . ." Kohn highlights Powell's publication of an op-ed piece during the 1992 presidential campaign warning against intervention in Bosnia.

¹⁰² Johnson and Metz, 209.

¹⁰³ Kriedberg and Henry, 118, 208. To assure a reserve pool of partially trained officers, Congress passed the Morrill Act of 2 July 1862, which provided a grant of public lands to each state that were to be sold and the money derived used to endow a state college where agriculture, mechanics, and military tactics would be taught. These institutions were known as Land Grant Colleges. The National Defense Security Act of 3 June 1916 formally established the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and authorized the establishment of programs subject to provisions of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862. Title 10 USC § 983, commonly referred to as the Solomon Amendment allows the Secretary of Defense to deny federal grants to institutions of higher education if they prohibit or prevent ROTC or military recruitment on campus. Top-tier Universities (also known as Tier 1 national research universities) are those the highest ranked universities that offer a full range of undergraduate majors, masters, and doctoral degrees programs. Every year *U.S. News & World Report's* "America's Best College" releases the rankings of National universities and placed them into Top Schools, Tier 3, Tier 4, or Unranked Schools.

resulted in removal of programs from some of the most prestigious schools in the nation.¹⁰⁴ However, with the repeal of ‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’, which now allows homosexuals to serve openly in the military, many of these top-tier universities are exploring the possibility of reinstituting ROTC programs on their campuses. While budget constraints may preclude the large-scale expansion of programs in the near future, it is arguable that returning ROTC to institutions such as Harvard, Columbia, and Stanford could be mutually beneficial. From the military’s perspective, it could increase the talent of the recruiting pool. From the perspective of society, it could provide high quality students the opportunity to serve and potentially put them in a position to influence the thinking and practices of the military service.¹⁰⁵ Finally, it could provide exposure to the future meritocratic class leaders and enhance society’s connection to the military.

Since the establishment of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission in 1988, hundreds of military bases across the country have closed, and their functions eliminated or consolidated at larger bases primarily located in Texas, the Pacific Northwest, and the Southeastern United States. Ironically, these same geographic regions are over-represented in terms of enlistments compared to the rest of the country. While these actions have realized a significant cost savings to the taxpayer, they have also had the unintended consequence of expanding the gap between the military and the society it serves by creating a level of geographic separation reminiscent of the isolation of the pre-World War II military.¹⁰⁶ This coupled with the

¹⁰⁴ Arthur T. Coumbe and Lee S. Hartford, *U.S. Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History*, (Cadet Command Historical Study Series, Fort Monroe, VA, 1996), 33.

¹⁰⁵ Ryan Mac, “Stanford Considers Bringing ROTC Back, *New York Times*,” (5 March 2010), <http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/stanford-considers-inviting-the-rotc-back-on-campus-after-nearly-40-years/> (accessed 21 January 2013).

¹⁰⁶ Erik J. Dahl, “The Mirror is Cracked, Not Broken, *Proceedings*, 125, no.12 (December 1999), 34-38, <http://search.proquest.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/docview/205990776> (accessed 21

reduction of military personnel during the same period has resulted in a smaller military footprint and therefore a smaller connection with society.

Throughout the history of the United States numerous global events and institutional changes have contributed to shaping the civil-military relationship. Events such as entry into the Cold War, Base Realignment, posturing of ROTC units, and the transition to the AVF have pressured the civil-military relationship and in-manner cases altered the interactions between the actors.

Society

While the military may underpin the civil-military gap, society and the societal imperative exert a tremendous amount of pressure on the other actors, primarily because both are drawn from the American population. With regards to the military, the perceptions of society will directly impact those who serve within the Armed Forces of the United States.

Throughout its history, the United States has relied upon a small standing Army during times of peace augmented by citizen soldiers, drawn primarily through conscription in times of crisis.¹⁰⁷ This methodology has served the nation well by ensuring adequate forces were available when needed and by forging a link with population who would provide the conscripts.¹⁰⁸ However, over the past decade, the nation's approach to fighting its wars has changed as the United States did not activate the Selective Service System, but chose instead to fight the Global War on Terrorism using its small standing army of volunteers. These volunteers constitute less than one percent of the American population, and represent for the first time in recent history an

January 2013).

¹⁰⁷ Thomas Owens, 129-132. According to Owens, "Today's American soldier is a citizen-soldier in the legal sense; he is not a citizen-soldier in the traditional sense."

¹⁰⁸ Atkinson, 9.

instance where the nation went to war while asking very little sacrifice from the American public. In addition, as Figure 2 indicates the percentage of the serving population has continued to decline that since World War II, and indications are this trend will continue based on projected cuts in DOD end strength.¹⁰⁹ These two factors have created a new paradigm for how America intends to fight its wars, and serves to separate further the military from the population it serves and relies upon to fill its ranks.




Figure 2. Military Participation.¹¹⁰

Forty years since the transition to the AVF and after ten years of persistent conflict fought by a small number of volunteers, the American population, while appreciative of their service, finds itself disconnected from the military that defends it. It is also arguable that the majority of the American population has detached themselves from the current wars, and views military service, while admirable, as something for somebody else to do.

¹⁰⁹ PEW Research Report, 8.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 8.

While many people may disagree with the recent wars and their associated policies, those who serve and the military institution itself, enjoy an unprecedented amount of public confidence and support. A recent Gallup survey found that the military topped the list of America's most trusted institutions with nearly seventy-eight percent of the respondents expressing confidence in the Armed Forces.¹¹¹ In addition, recent Pew polling indicates that ninety-one percent of the public say they have felt proud of the soldiers; seventy-six percent say they have personally thanked someone in the military for their service; and fifty-eight percent say they have done something to help someone in the military or their family.¹¹² This data indicates that unlike previous periods, particularly during the Vietnam War, the American public does feel an obligation to support the troops whether they agree with the war or not.

While supporting the troops is one thing, understanding them is another. The same Pew polling indicates that eighty-four percent of the post 9/11 veterans believe that the public does not understand the military while seventy-one percent of the American public shares the same impression.¹¹³ In addition, when asked about sacrifices since 9/11, only forty-three percent of those polled believed that the American people had made significant sacrifices since 9/11 and half believed that the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had little impact on their lives.¹¹⁴

While the polling data makes the argument that the American public supports the military while not fully understanding the sacrifices associated with service, it does not fully explain

¹¹¹ Gallup Confidence in Institutions Poll, 6-12 June 2012, 1, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/Confidence-Institutions.aspx> Gallup (accessed 14 November 2012).

¹¹² PEW Research Report, 13.

¹¹³ Ibid., 8.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 9.

where the disconnect lies. In examining the causes of the expanding gap between the military and society, it is evident that current force structure and the AVF contribute significantly.

During World War II, nearly sixteen million American out of a population of 140 million served, and nearly everybody in the nation had a loved one in harm's way; everyone had a vested interest. Following the September 2011 attacks, the administration made the point that the economy was being attacked and therefore the nation needed to contribute by shopping to keep the economy strong. David Segal, Director of the Research on Military Organizations at the University of Maryland, highlights the fact that the majority of the nation had little skin in the game when he stated, "the Army went to war, and the public went to Wal-Mart."¹¹⁵ In contrast, fewer than one and a half million of a population of 308 million have served during the past decade.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, the American public was asked to sacrifice in tangible ways during World War II, such as purchasing war bonds, collecting rubber, and even going to work to fill jobs of those who had gone overseas. In contrast, during the past decade, less than 1.5 million Americans have served in uniform and very few members of society have been personally invested in the fight.¹¹⁷ The same logic applies taking into account the implementation of the AVF. Without conscription, the realities and potential for military service are not equitably visible to the American population writ large.

Elizabeth Samet, an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, recently wrote that the phrase "thank you for your service," has become an obligatory salutation, which lacks

¹¹⁵ PEW Research Report, 27. Comments made by David R. Segal during Pew symposium.

¹¹⁶ Taylor, 9.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

substance.¹¹⁸ After the greeting, both parties retreat to separate camps without a significant exchange of ideas or perspective. While there is no doubt that the thanks is genuine, Samet's point highlights the gap between the military and society, and lends credence to Admiral Mullen's fear that, "they do not know us." The following anecdote provided by a senior officer further demonstrates the disconnect:

A few years ago, while on a five-hour overseas flight, an Army officer was seated next to a well-educated and well-traveled woman from the San Francisco Bay Area. When the woman learned that the officer was in the Army, she responded saying, "Oh that is terrible, but you haven't been to Iraq and Afghanistan have you? The officer responded by saying, yes he had been to both and asked her why she thought being in the military was terrible? She then spent several minutes providing her opinions regarding all the horrible things that were happening in the war (based mainly on what she had seen on television). While the officer concurred that many bad things happen in war, he then proceeded to explain what he had spent the majority of his time working on during his last deployment, which included Economic Development, Governance, and Rule of Law. He also explained the risks that coalition forces took to avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties, as well as the risks associated with executing the aforementioned functions. As the plane landed, the woman dutifully thanked the officer for his service and said she had enjoyed talking to him. Her final comment was the most telling, as they de-planed she said "You are the first person, I have ever spoken to in the military."¹¹⁹

In conclusion, the American population is confident in the military and does support those who serve. However, it is also evident that in Admiral Mullen's words, "they do not know us." The shrinking size of the military and the transition away from conscription has severed many of the ties between the military and society. No longer is there a shared sense of sacrifice, and the fighting of the nation's wars are left in the hands of a few volunteers who are connected directly to only a small segment of society. It is also worth noting that society's disconnection from the military also translates into a disconnection from the elected civilian leadership. Because

¹¹⁸ Elizabeth Samet, On War, Guilt and 'Thank You for Your Service': <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-02/war-guilt-and-thank-you-for-your-service-commentary-by-elizabeth-samet.html>.

¹¹⁹ Author's personal experience, February 2010.

the majority of society has no skin in the game, they do not necessarily engage the elected leaders in a serious conversation regarding the employment of the military.¹²⁰

Diversity

Based on the research thus far, it is evident that the military as an institution and in terms of its leadership lacks a level of diversity commensurate with the nation it serves and its civilian leaders. Whether some will argue that the discussion of diversity is simply an extension of equal opportunity programs, an outright assault on the military profession, or a threat to the quality of the force, it is imperative that the military address this imbalance. In contrast, failure to do so will decrease the quality of the force by denying the military access to the highest quality recruits, and further widen the civil-military gap. In an era in which society is disconnected from the military, a smaller number of the population meets the eligibility requirements for service, and competition exists from other employment sectors, the military must achieve a greater level of diversification within its ranks. It must open its recruiting aperture in order to tap into the inherent talent of the nation to create an environment that is appealing to a wider demographic. This would not only increase the effectiveness of the military by capitalizing on the diversity of the nation, but also narrow the gap between society and the armed forces.

On 26 July 1948, President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981, setting in motion events that eventually led to the desegregation of the Armed Forces.¹²¹ Since that time, the United States Army has been at the forefront of implementing institutional change that has consistently endeavored to ensure equal opportunities for promotion and advancement of its minority members. In recent years, the discussion within the DOD has moved past one simply of

¹²⁰ Pew Research Center, 18. Comments made by Larry Korb at Pew symposium.

¹²¹ President Harry Truman, "Executive Order 9981," *The White House*, (26 July 1948), <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/9981a.htm>.

equal opportunity, and has transformed into a discussion concerning the multifaceted topic of diversity. In 2008, Congress established the MLDC as part of the Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Authorization Act with the broad charter of conducting a comprehensive study of the policies associated with opportunities for promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces.¹²² The Commission included consideration of minority members who may become senior officers. In outlining the scope of study, Congress directed sixteen tasks for the commission, seven of which specifically use the term *diversity*. The Commission's final report, published in March 2011, concluded top military leaders are neither representative of the population they serve nor the forces they lead. The report went on to say that this trend will only continue as the nation sees increases in African-American and Hispanic youth and a proportional decline in White non-Hispanic youth¹²³. Additionally, in the past several years, many uniformed and civilian leaders have commented that more diversity is needed within the senior officer ranks. However, while most will agree that diversity is important, very little substantive discussion has been found, which explains the reasons why.

While the term diversity is often used, it is also often misunderstood or not well defined. Currently the DOD has no standard definition of diversity, which results in each service working from its own interpretation.¹²⁴ In an attempt to establish a more functional definition, the MLDC

¹²² U.S. Congress—Senate. *Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009*.

¹²³ Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 15.

¹²⁴ Nelson Lim, Michelle Cho, and Kimberly Curry, 12. Service Definitions. Army: "Differences in Soldiers and civilians that can have a positive impact on mission effectiveness in the Army"; Navy: "All the different characteristics and attributes of individual Sailors and civilians, which enhance the mission readiness of the Navy"; Marine Corps: "An inclusive culture that recognizes and values the similarities and differences of individuals to effectively meet the goals of the organization"; Air Force: "Builds on equal opportunity; encompasses not only gender and race/ethnicity, but also cultural knowledge, language ability, geographic awareness, education, and related characteristics."

defines diversity as “all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with DOD core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment and reflective of the Nation we serve.”¹²⁵ The report further synthesizes this definition by arguing that it goes beyond the traditional concept of diversity by shifting focuses away from eliminating discrimination against members of certain groups and towards valuing and leveraging all kinds of human differences including demographic differences.¹²⁶ These definitions, as well as other common ones appear broad natured, but in most cases, the practice of diversity tends to focus on issues of social identities such as race and gender.¹²⁷ Even the MLDC Final Report, while it seeks a broader approach, tends to focus primarily on improving opportunities based on ethnicity and gender. While these are certainly important components, it is arguable that in order to leverage the diversity of the nation, the discussion must move past these components and focus on diversity in terms of inclusion and creating an environment that appeals to a more diverse swath of the American population. This argument is supported by looking at Defense Business Board research that approaches diversity as a business imperative, and posits that over time, an organization should progress from simply a discussion of ethnicity and gender to achieving a level of inclusion that improves the effectiveness of the organization (Figure 3).¹²⁸ At the rudimentary level, diversity focuses on the legal requirements associated with Equal Employment

¹²⁵ Military Leadership Diversity Commission, xiv.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 6-7.

¹²⁷ Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews, *LSC the Future of the Army Profession, Revised and Expanded Second Edition*, 2 ed. (Boston: Learning Solutions, 2005), 709.

¹²⁸ Defense Business Board, 7-8. http://dbb.defense.gov/pdf/Increasing_diversity_03-04.pdf (accessed 10 November 2012). The Defense Business Bureau was established by The Secretary of Defense, under the provision of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972 (5 U.S.C., Appendix, as amended) and 41CFR §102-3.50(d) with the charter of providing independent advice and recommendations on critical matters concerning the Department of Defense (DOD).

Opportunity and Affirmative Action, and addresses only a narrow cross section of the population such as ethnic groups. As the model progresses towards inclusion, the focus expands towards a broader cross section of the population in terms of how their talents and differences can provide the organization with a competitive advantage. It is in this context that the military should approach the discussion, taking into account all aspects of diversity to include gender, ethnicity, religion, education, ways of thinking, and cultural background.




Figure 3. Diversity Progression Matrix.¹²⁹

The new paradigm adopted by the United States during the past decade of persistent conflict clearly indicates that it is unlikely that the nation will return to conscription in the foreseeable future. Instead, the nation will rely on a small high quality force composed of volunteers who will be drawn from an ever-shrinking recruiting pool.

During the past decade, the majority of individuals recruited into the Armed Forces came from the Mountain-West and Southern United States, and were overrepresented in comparison to the population of those regions, with the remainder of the nation being under-represented in their

¹²⁹ Defense Business Board, 7-8. http://dbb.defense.gov/pdf/Increasing_diversity_03-04.pdf (accessed 10 November 2012).

respective regions.¹³⁰ Data also indicates that in the past decade, while African-Americans were slightly under-representative of the population; Hispanics were largely under-represented, and Caucasians were equally represented.¹³¹ The disparity among Hispanics is of particular concern as they constitute the fastest growing demographic category in the United States and are projected to represent twenty-four percent of the population by 2040.¹³² Comparatively African Americans will reach approximately fourteen percent of the population by the same year.¹³³ This indicates, especially in regards to geography and the Hispanic population, that the military is only reaching a small portion of the demographic. In addition to not reaching the wider demographic of American society, Curtis Gilroy, the DOD Director of Accessions, reported in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in 2009 that seventy-five percent of the young people, ages 17-24, were currently not eligible to enlist for a number of reasons.¹³⁴ Considering that the military is only reaching a portion of the demographic and must compete for the remaining twenty-five percent of the recruiting pool with the civilian sector, it is possible, that in the long term, the military may have trouble meeting its recruiting goals or, at a minimum, attracting the highest quality recruits.

¹³⁰ Watkins and Sherk, 7.

¹³¹ Ibid., 5.

¹³² U.S. Census, "Table 4. Projections of the Population by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States: 2015 to 2060 (NP2012-T4)," *U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division* (December 2012), <http://www.census.gov/population/projections/data/national/2012/summarytables.html> (accessed 14 January 2013).

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Curtis Gilroy, Congressional Hearings, 3 March 2009; House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military, Hearing on Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength, 5, (accessed 21 January 2013). In his testimony Gilroy states, "declining pool of eligible and qualified young people in American today who want to serve, owing mostly to health, physical fitness issues, and education problems."

Understanding that it must compete with the civilian market place for the same recruits, the military must ensure that its product, military service, appeals to the target audience. Currently, in addition to its multi-million dollar advertising campaign, the military provides numerous incentives to increase its appeal to include bonuses, educational benefits, and choice of occupational specialty and geographic assignment. While all of these incentives are helpful in reaching the recruiting pool they alone are not enough to bring in the highest quality recruits from across the nation. The gap between society, to include the younger generation who constitute the recruiting pool and those who influence them, may hinder the military's ability to compete with the civilian labor force.¹³⁵ Therefore, it is imperative that the military visibly demonstrate to the recruiting pool that it is representative of their values and attitudes and that they can achieve success in the organization. The fact that the senior leadership of the military is predominately male, Caucasian, and drawn from the Combat Arms branches, may indicate to many potential high quality recruits, that unless they fit that demographic, the opportunities for career progression are relatively low; the results being that many recruits may turn away from military service in favor of other career opportunities.

The challenge for the military in this regard is that it simply cannot transform the diversity of its senior leadership overnight. On average, an officer will have twenty-five years' time in service before they reach the General Officer level and many other factors affect whether or not an officer can reach that level of success.¹³⁶ However, it can begin by removing barriers for promotion and increase the opportunities for equitable career progression. The recent announcement by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, which opens all military specialties to females, is one such barrier and is a step in the right direction. This however does not change the

¹³⁵ Snider and Matthews, 707.

¹³⁶ Nelson Lim, Michelle Cho, and Kimberly Curry, xiii.

fact that other minority officers are concentrated in the support career fields, which again, do not fare as well as the combat arms fields regarding promotion to the senior ranks. The military must address this by focusing its officer recruiting efforts on the wider demographic, especially as the minority population share is projected to increase in the future.

In addition to presenting a visible indicator of representation to the recruiting pool, increasing diversity in the Officer Corps, and in particular at the senior officer ranks, will assist in shrinking the gap between the military and the civilian leadership. It is essential that the military focus a greater portion of its recruiting efforts on those who would otherwise be inclined to join the meritocratic class. Regardless of whether or not these individuals remain in the military, their service will expose the military leaders to a different demographic than is currently prevalent in the officer corps. Furthermore, the experience and perspective gained by these individuals who may eventually serve in senior civilian positions will benefit the relationship as well.

A diverse and inclusive organization, which is representative of the society it serves, will draw from the highest quality of available recruits, which inherently will improve the force. Furthermore, it will appeal to those recruits and serve to re-establish a connection with the American population.

Conclusion

Soldier and scholar General Sir John Hackett, in his book, *The Profession of Arms*, states that “When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; the mirror is a true one and the face it sees will be its own.”¹³⁷ While Hackett makes a valid point, which in all likelihood would be in keeping with the vision of the Founding Fathers, it is clear from a contemporary perspective, that when America looks at its fighting forces, it does not see its own reflection. In

¹³⁷ John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 158.

contrast, the reflection reveals a military that is not representative of the society it serves and an expanding gap between the actors. Failure to address this trend will reduce the effectiveness of the military, limit its ability to sustain high quality all volunteer force, and potentially threaten the security of the United States.

Tensions between the conservative requirements of military service and the more liberal outlook of civil society go back to the founding of the nation and form the basis of the civil-military relationship.¹³⁸ The American Liberal Tradition, friction between the societal and functional imperatives, the ascendancy of the military profession, and institutional change have all pressured the relationship and served to expand the gap between the military and the nation it serves (Figure 4).




Figure 4. Tensions affecting the Civil-Military Relationship¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Richard D. Hooker Jr. "Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations," *Parameters* 41, no. 4 (Winter 2011/2012), 2.

¹³⁹ Created by Author based on writings of Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89.

Early liberal thought in the United States stressed the values of individualism, capitalism, and private interest and the belief that a large standing military was both unnecessary and a threat to the nation.¹⁴⁰ Historically the United States, in keeping with these liberal principles, has shunned a large standing military and relied on *citizen-soldiers* in time of conflict by raising armies and its leaders from the society it defends. Once the conflict subsides, those recruited to fight and lead have returned to civil society leaving only a small standing military. From this perspective, in the early days of the nation little distinction could be made between civil and military society as all were cut from the same cloth. However, over time and often during times of peace, the military evolved into a profession, which was autonomous and separate from society.¹⁴¹ This military profession tended to be conservative in nature, in contrast to the liberal principles of society and its civilian leaders.¹⁴²

In the aftermath of World War II and with the advent of the Cold War, the United States, out of necessity, forewent its liberal tendencies in favor of maintaining a large standing peacetime army in response to the Soviet threat.¹⁴³ This change in defense policy changed the role of the military within the civil-military relationship by increasing its role in the discussion of national defense. Furthermore, during this period the United States, for the first time in its history instituted a peacetime draft.

The Cold War period also changed the dynamic of those who led the military in terms of both the civilian and the military leadership. From the civilian perspective, the large number of *citizen-soldiers*, who had returned from the World War, as well as those who served during the

¹⁴⁰ Skelton, 325.

¹⁴¹ Huntington, 20.

¹⁴² Hooker, 2

¹⁴³ Millett and Maslowski, 471.

period of peacetime conscription, formed a nucleus of future civilian leaders with a shared common experience of military service. From the military perspective, this period saw the rise of a professional officer corps, but also one who was still connected to society due to several factors. First, the military leader shared a common connection with the civilian leadership as both, for the most part, possessed the common experience of military service. Secondly, due to the nature of the Cold War and society's acceptance of a large standing peacetime force, the military maintained a connection to society.

With the end of conscription in 1973 and the subsequent end of the Cold War in 1989, however a gap began to develop between the military, its civilian leaders, and society. In the absence of conscription, the civilian leadership began to lack the common experience of military service and transitioned into a meritocratic class that distanced itself from the military.¹⁴⁴ Society, facing no perceived threat, reverted to their liberal tendencies and favored a drawdown of the military, which inevitably occurred. The military leadership continued to professionalize and has evolved into an elite institutionalized caste of its own. These trends have been exacerbated in the past decade of persistent conflict in which the United States chose not to activate the Selective Service System and instead has relied on a small number of volunteers to fight the nation's wars.

Today, less than one percent of the American population serves in the military and with projected force reductions and an aversion to returning to conscription it is likely that this will remain the case. The results of these factors is a society that is increasingly disconnected from the military, a class of civilian leaders who lack the perspectives gained by military service, and a military that is potentially more isolated and institutionalized than at any other point in American history. Furthermore, the pool of potential recruits is limited and the military's recruiting efforts

¹⁴⁴ Lasch, 4.

are failing to reach the wider demographic of the American population. This means that the military is failing to leverage the diversity of the nation and may very well not be attracting the very best the nation has to offer.

In order to reverse these trends, it is imperative that the military leverages all aspects of the nation's diversity to include gender, ethnicity, religion, education, thought, and cultural background to create and sustain an inclusive organization, which attracts the best that the nation has to offer. While this will take time and it is unlikely that the military will ever be a total mirror image of the nation, several things can be done in pursuit of that goal.

Most importantly, the military must expand its recruiting efforts for both officers and enlisted personnel to reach the entire demographic of the nation. They must address emerging population trends and focus on recruiting from all demographics. In addition, efforts must be undertaken to return ROTC programs to top-tier universities, which will draw upon an elite class of society and expose those same students to the military. These efforts will improve the overall quality of the force by drawing upon the inherent talents of the nation.

The military must continue working towards eliminating barriers to promotion and career progression. This will visibly demonstrate to the recruiting pool that equitable opportunities exist within the military. Lifting the ban on females serving in combat career fields is one such action. However, more must be done to achieve a greater level of demographic diversity across the combat arms branches.

Lastly, in addition to the monetary, quality of life, and educational incentives available to recruits, the military must create an environment, which appeals to values and aspirations of America's younger generation. Only then will it be successful in competing with the civilian sector for the highest quality recruits.

While the Founding Father's fears of a military coup d'état have been and most likely will continue to be unfounded, it is evident that a civil-military gap exists which, if not repaired,

could have adverse effects on the security of the nation. While the military, by nature, differs in perspective from the society it serves, increasing diversity and making the organization more inclusive will strengthen the civil-military relationship and enhance the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces.

APPENDIX A

	Total	Caucasian		African American		Other (To include Hispanic)	
U.S. Pop	308,745,538	223,533,265	72%	38,929,319	13%	50,477,594	16%
Total Military*	1,413,937 (0.46%)	986,454	70%	233,601	17%	130,097	9%
Enlisted	1,168,064	794,946	68%	210,749	18%	114,076	10%
Warrant Officers	21,226	14,283	67%	3,714	17%	3229	15%
Com Officer Total	224,647	177,225	78%	19138	9%	15,094	7%
Company Grade	133,790	103,587	77%	11,169	8%	10,247	8%
Field Grade	89,880	72,756	80%	7905	8%	4,824	6%
Flag Officer	977	882	90%	64	6%	23	2%

*Includes U.S. Coast Guard

Data Derived from the Defense Manpower Data Center and 2010 U.S. Census

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bailey, Beth. *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Bowman, Karlyn, Andrew Rugg, and Emily Simmonds. *Polls on Patriotism and Military Service: AEI Public Opinion Studies*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, June 2011.
- Britannica, Inc. Encyclopaedia, ed. *Encyclopedia Britannica* (32 Book Set). 32 vols. Philadelphia, PA: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 2003.
- Bumiller, Elisabeth. "Gates Fears Wider Gaps between Country and Military." *New York Times*, 29 September 2010.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Coffman, Edward M. "The Long Shadow of the Soldier and the State." *The Journal of Military History* 55, no. 1 (January 1991).
- Cohen, Eliot A. "Making Do with Less, or Coping with Upton's Ghost." *Report presented at the U.S. Army War College Sixth Annual Strategy Conference*, Location Unknown.
- Coumbe, Arthur T. *U.S. Army Cadet Command: The 10 Year History*. Fort Monroe, VA.: U.S. Army Cadet Command, 1996.
- Dahl, Erik J. "The Mirror is Cracked, Not Broken." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 125, Issue 12 (December 1999): 34-38. <http://search.proquest.com/lumen.cgscarl.com/docview/205990776> (accessed 16 December 2012).
- Daniel, Lisa. "BRAC Offers Unmatched Cost Savings, Pentagon Official Says." *American Forces Press Service* (21 March 2012). <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67641> (accessed 16 December 2012).
- Defense Business Board. *Report to the Senior Executive Council, Department of Defense. Washington: Task Group on Increasing Diversity in DOD's Flag and Senior Executive Ranks*. Washington, DC: Defense Business Board, 1 March 2004.
- Douglas, Johnson, and Metz Steven. "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate." *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 197-98.
- Dunlap, Charles J. Jr. "The Military-Industrial Complex." *Daedalus* 140, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 135-47. <http://search.proquest.com/lumen.cgscarl.com/docview/903556053> (accessed 18 January 2013).
- Dunlap, Charles Jr. *Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the Collapse of Civil-Military Relations in the United States*. US Air Force Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 1996.
- Federation for American Immigration Reform. *Projecting the U. S. Population to 2050: Four Immigration Scenarios*. Merrifield, VA: FAIR Horizon Press, March 2006.
- Finkelman, Paul, and Wallenstein P. *The Encyclopedia of American Political History*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001.
- Friedberg, Aaron L. *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War GRAND Strategy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

- Gallup Poll. "Confidence in Institutions." *Gallup.com*. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx?version=print> (accessed 14 November 2012).
- Griffith, Robert K. Jr., *United States Army's Transition to the All Volunteer Force, 1968-74. Army Historical Series S/n 008-029-00307-4*. (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army, 1997).
- Hackett, John. *The Profession of Arms*. New York: Macmillan, 1983.
- Hadley, Arthur T. *The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure, America's Armed Forces: a Report from the Field*. New York: Random House, 1986.
- Halberstam, David. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*. New York: Scribner, 2002.
- Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. *The Federalist Papers*. New York: Bantam Classics, 1982.
- Herspring, Dale R. *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005.
- Hooker, Richard D. Jr. "Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations." *Parameters* 41, no. 4 (Winter 2011/2012): 1-14.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Belknap Press). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960.
- Justice, Keith. *Presidents, Vice Presidents, Cabinet Members, Supreme Court Justices, 1789-2003: Vital and Official Data*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2003.
- Kohn, Richard H. "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations." *The National Interest* 37 (Spring 1994): 3. <http://nationalinterest.org/article/out-of-control-the-crisis-in-civil-military-relations-343> (accessed 16 January 2013).
- Kohn, Richard. *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States*. New York: New York University Press, 1995.
- Korte, Gregory. "Fewer Members of Congress Today Also Served in Military." *USA Today*, (11 November 2011). <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-11-10/congress-members-military-service/51159918/1> (accessed 16 January 2013).
- Krawczynski, Keith. *American Revolution*. Detroit: St James Press, 2003.
- Kriedberg, Marvin A. and Henry G. Merton. *U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 30 November 1955.
- Lasch, Christopher. *The Revolt of the Elites: and the Betrayal of Democracy*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995.
- Lemann, Nicholas. "Curse of the Merit Class: America's New Ruling Caste is Bad News for the Country." *The Washington Post*, 9 February 1992.
- Lim, Nelson, Michelle Cho, and Kimberly Curry. *Planning for Diversity: Options and Recommendations for DOD Leaders*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008.

- Lim, Nelson. *RAND Report: Officer Classification and the Future of Diversity among Senior Military Leaders*. N.P.: RAND Corporation, 2009.
- Lind, Michael. *Vietnam: the Necessary War: a Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.
- Luis Martinez and Amy Bingham, "U.S. Veterans by the Numbers." *ABC News* (11 November 2011). <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-veterans-numbers/story?id=14928136#3> (accessed 16 January 2013).
- Mac, Ryan. "Stanford Considers Bringing ROTC Back." *New York Times*, (5 March 2010). <http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/stanford-considers-inviting-the-rotc-back-on-campus-after-nearly-40-years/> (accessed 12 January 2013).
- Manning, Jennifer E. "Membership of the 112th Congress: A Profile." *Congressional Research Service* (1 March 2011). <http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/R41647.pdf> (accessed 16 January 2013).
- Maslowski, Peter "Understand the Creation of the U.S. Armed Forces." *Foreign Policy Research Institute* 12, no. 10 (April 2007). <http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1210.200704.maslowski.creationusarmedforces.ghml> (accessed 7 February 2013).
- McDougall, Walter A. *Promised Land, Crusader State: the American Encounter with the World since 1776*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997.
- Miles, Richard G. "Those Who Fight, Those Who Decide." *Newsweek*, 22 November 1993.
- Military Leadership Diversity Commission. *From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military*. Arlington: Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 15 March 2011.
- Millett, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: a Military History of the United States of America*. London: Free Press, 1984.
- Nielsen, Suzanne C., and Don M. Snider, eds. *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
- Owens, Mackubin Thomas. *U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*. New York: Continuum, 2011.
- Paret, Peter, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds. *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Pavelec, Sterling Michael, ed. *The Military-Industrial Complex and American Society*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010.
- Pew Research Center. "The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era." *Lecture*, Willard Intercontinental Hotel, Washington, DC, 5 October 2011. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/10/pew_research_military_event_TRANSCRIPT.pdf (accessed 13 March 2013).
- Powell, Colin. "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations: A response to Richard H. Kohn's 'Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations', no. 35, Spring 1994." *The National Interest* 36 (Summer 1993): 23. <http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA15592363&v=2.1&u=97mwrlib&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w> (accessed 21 November 2012).
- Resch, John P., ed "Military Industrial Complex." <http://go.galegroup.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/ps/i.do?action=interpret&id=GALEpercent7CCX3427300394&v=2.1&u=97mwrlib&it=r&p=GVL&sw=w&authCount=1> (accessed 10 January 2013).

- Rizzo, Jennifer. "Veterans in Congress at Lowest Level since World War II." *CNN U.S.* <http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/01/20/congress.veterans/index.html> (accessed 16 January 2013).
- Roger Mills, Folsom. *Policy Analysis: Can Conscription Work?* Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1981. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa001.html> (accessed 20 January 2013).
- Samet, Elizabeth "On War, Guilt and 'Thank You for Your Service': Elizabeth Samet." *Bloomberg.com* (1 August 2011). <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-02/war-guilt-and-thank-you-for-your-service-commentary-by-elizabeth-samet.html> (accessed 29 January 2013).
- Saunders, Debra. "Obama Team Light On Military Service." *San Francisco Chronicle* (12 October 2010): under "SFGate." <http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Saunders-Obama-team-light-on-military-service-3171077.php> (accessed 16 January 2013).
- Schmitt, Gary and Cheryl Miller, "The Military Should Mirror the Nation." *Wall Street Journal* (26 August 2010): A5. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703632304575451531529098478.html> (accessed 17 February 2013).
- Segal, David R., and Mady Wechsler Segal. "America's Military Population." *Population Bulletin* 58, no. 4 (December 2004): 1-20.
- Skelton, William B. "High Army Leadership in the Era of the War of 1812: The Making and Remaking of the Officer Corps." *The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series* 51, no. 2 (April 1994): 253-74.
- Skelton, William B. "The Journal of Military History: Samuel P. Huntington, and the Roots of the American Military Tradition." *The Journal of Military History* 60, no. 2 (April 1996): 325.
- Smith, Tom W. "National Service" *American Association for Public Opinion Research Center*, 54 (1990): 273-85.
- Snider, Don, and Lloyd Matthews. *LSC, the Future of the Army Profession, Revised and Expanded Second Edition*. 2 ed. Boston: Learning Solutions, 2005.
- Summers, Harry G. *On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. New York: Dell, 1984.
- Swain, Richard M. "Lucky War" *Third Army in Desert Storm*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC.
- The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States: With Index*. New York: Bantam Classics, 1998.
- The White House. "Establishing the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services." *Executive Order 9981*. Washington, DC, 26 July 1948.
- U.S. Congress—House, House Armed Services Committee. *Hearing on Recruiting, Retention, and End Strength*. Washington, DC, 3 March 2009.
- U.S. Congress—Senate. "National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2009." Washington, DC, 2008.
- U.S. Congress—Senate. *Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009*. S. 3001. 110th Cong., 2d sess., (14 October 2008): S 123.

- U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 11 August 2011.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *The Armed Forces Officer: 2007 Edition (National Defense University)*. Revised ed. Washington, DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2007.
- Volkman, Steven D. "Understanding the Dynamics of the Civil-Military Gap." *USAWC Strategy Research Project*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001.
- Watkins, Shanea J., and James Sherk. *Who Serves in the U.S. Military? Demographic Characteristics of Enlisted Troops and Officers*. The Heritage Foundation, 21 August 2008.
- Weigley, Russell F., ed., "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
- Wood, Gordon S. *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*. New York: Knopf, 1992.
- Young, Shaun P. *Beyond Rawls: an Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002.